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Theoretical, psychoanalytical constructs referring to the unconscious, the superego, and
id, enjoy an autonomy within the I.  As such, this study contemplates the discussion of
these foreign entities that inhabit the interior of the I, producing an effect of foreignness.
In the first section, I will develop a reflection on the state of foreignness of the unconscious.
I will begin with an analogy used by Freud, which addresses the thesis of universality of
consciousness with the psychoanalytical thesis of the subconscience within the I. Affirmation
of consciousness in the other may be used analogously for affirm the idea of another
inhabiting our own being. I shall continue, seeking to understand how the process of
unconscious repression produces the effect of foreignness. The idea of a moral censor
present in the entity of the superego constitutes the theme of the second section. The
superego follows the principle of otherness in its constitution and in its effects on the I.
Finally, a reflection on the dimension of otherness in the Id seems urgent to me, as with
this concept, Freud radicalized in the idea of the foreign as the origin of the subject.
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Los constructos teóricos psicoanalíticos que se refieren al inconsciente, al superyó y al
ello disfrutan de autonomía dentro del yo. Como tales, este estudio contempla la discusión
de estas entidades foráneas que habitan el interior del yo, produciendo un efecto de algo
ajeno. Primero, desarrollaré una reflexión sobre el estado foráneo del inconsciente.
Empezaé con una analogía empleada por Freud, que aborda la tesis de la universalidad
de la conciencia con la tesis psicoanalítica del inconsciente dentro del yo. La afirmación
de la conciencia en el otro puede usarse de forma análoga para afirmar la idea de que
otro habite nuestro propio ser. Continuaré la búsqueda para entender cómo el proceso
de la represión  inconsciente produce el efecto de lo ajeno. La idea de un censor moral
presente en la entidad del superyó constituye el tema de la segunda parte. El superyó
sigue un principio de otredad tanto en su constitución como en sus efectos sobre el yo.
Finalmente, una reflexión sobre la dimensión de la otredad en el Ello me parece urgente,
ya que con este concepto Freud radicalizó la idea de lo foráneo como el origen del sujeto.
Palabras clave: psicoanálisis, otredad, inconsciente, superyó, ello
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Freudian psychoanalysis, frequently, is presented as a
theory and practice that broke with the tradition psychology
and medicine of the 19th century. But, despite all of the
discrepancy and rupture of psychoanalysis with traditional
means of confronting psychiatric problems, we can find within
history a series of theoretical presuppositions that constitues
a fertile ground from which Freudian psychoanalysis bloomed.
Garcia-Roza endeavours to succinctly explain
the”preconditions for the emergence of psychoanalysis”. “From
the archaeological perspective it (psychoanalysis) may be
seen as the effect of a series of connections between
knowledge and practice that constitute an historical basis that
enables its emergence”(Garcia Roza, 1987, p. 23).
Garcia-Roza’s work seems quite relevant to us, in so
much as would be that of the influence of the tripod
Illustration, Romanticism and Scientificism in Freudian
psychoanalysis. Yet, it is more common to point to Freud’s
divergence from the the thinking of his era. Freud was
audacious enough to dedicate himself to aspects that were
not commonly valued. Dreams, phallic imagery, and
symptoms without physiological causes were an area of
great interest to Freud. Freud was very reticent to abandon
physiological prepositions, the medical materialism of this
time. But, we can say that in the text of The Interpretation
of Dreams, Freud’s attempt to break with the materialist
tradition appears more clearly.
But, perhaps Freud’s greatest rupture with his era has
been the creation of the concept of the unconscious,
considered a system that possesses an operational mode
distinct from the conscious. Freud is even more audacious
upon revealing that the true psychic reality is found in the
unconscious.
Modern thought is defined by the primacy of the I,
unequivocally affirmed in Cartesian rationalism. The starting
point for philosophical reflection is the first certainty reached,
and that of the I as the primary existence (Cogito) and
conceived as subject, that is, as an existence completely
distinct from others. All of modern thought has come to be
interpreted as included in the paradigm of the philosophy
of the subject and the conscious, in which the image of the
solitary soul rules, thinking about its own experiences, so
that, from them, it may interact with others and the world.
There are many problems with this concept, however: How
could the I, in its isolation, thinking as a monad, be able to
know the objectivity of the world and relate with the other?
This difficulty was perceived by the very modern
philosopher, Spinoza, who refuted the Cartesian starting
point, and, by Kant, who established the irreducible
acknowledgement of the other as a requirement for practical
reasoning, as we can see in the second formula of the
categorical imperative presented in “The Foundation of
Customs.” “Act in such manner as to consider humanity,
whether in yourself, or in any other, also, too, as the end,
and not only the simple means”1. However, even
acknowledging these limits of conscientialist philosophy,
this remains. So, the philosophical tradition begun by
Descartes is interested in the guarantee and unity of
knowledge and truth, since the subject is the principle
rhetorician of modern knowledge. The problem of otherness
does not represent a possibility of responding to modern
epistemological problems. The Cartesian method of
questioning is an instrument for arriving at certainty. The
Cartesian conclusions are clear and distinct: I can question
everything, but I can not think that the I, which thinks all
thoughts and questions all things, doesn’t exist at the same
time that it thinks. The real existence of my I, as subject
which thinks, is absolutely certain. Thus, “Cogito ergo sum”
is a certainty, an irrefutable truth, Archimedian principle of
knowledge. The thinker is the only survivor of the universal
destruction produced by doubt, the firm foundation on which
modern epistemology is solidly constructed. 
However, psychoanalysis operates a subversion in the
subject inaugurated by Descartes, despite Lacan’s2 insistence
that the difference between Freudian psychoanalysis and
humanist practices is precisely in the possibility of the first
to produce its concepts from the scientific radicality of the
Cartesian subject. The Lacanian reading of the Cartesian
cogito is established in paradoxical hermeneutics, as in
Descartes, the subject is conscious, rational and autonomous,
while that the conception of Freudian subjectivity points to
the irreducibility of the unconscious, revealing the
unconscious constitutes the true psychic reality. According
to Lacan (1966), the famous Cartesian proposal – I think,
therefore I am – announces the presence of a thought prior
to “self-awareness.” Descartes would be affirming a pure
thought, unequipped with the qualities of consciousness, and,
thus, similar to what Freud called “unconscious thought.”3
The Lacanian interpretation of Descartes is reversed, since
it doesn’t begin with the “order of reasons”, and from the
internal logic of the Cartesian discourse, but aims to
demonstrate that psychoanalysis is part of the great traditions
of modern science initiated by Galileo and Descartes.4
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1 Severino, E.. Modern philosophy. Lisboa, Editions 70. Spinoza’s refusal from the Cartesian perspective is clearly expressed in the
statement: “The scholastics begin with things; Descartes begins with thought; I, myself, begin with God.” See, Verneaux, R. (1963).
Histoire de la philosophie moderne (History of modern philosophy). Paris Beauchesne.
2 See. Lacan, J. (1998). Science and truth. In Writings (p. 870). Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar.
3 See, Milner, J-C. (1996). The clear work Lacan, Science, Philosophy (p. 33-34).Rio de Janeiro, Jorge Zahar. 
4 See, Milner, J-C. (1996). The clear work Lacan, Science, Philosophy (p. 36/38).Rio de Janeiro, Jorge Zahar. 
Despite Lacan’s proposal, we can confirm that Freud dealt
a blow to modern narcissism, dethroning the consciousness
from its palace. The subject is not this rational, indestructible
unit. Psychoanalysis revealed a contradiction in this subject
and injected the problem of otherness into the breast of
identity. The idea of “otherness” appears to be associated
spontaneously with “exteriority”, and the “other” and that
which is outside of the “I”, in the same manner that the
“object” is classically opposite to the “subject.” Psychoanalysis
showed us, however, that, if the “other” is identified as foreign,
this foreignness is not that of another in relation to an
integrated and autocentric I, but, is that which lives this same
I and makes it foreign to itself. The unconscious, which, from
the theory of repression, is the fundamental discovery of
Psychoanalysis, represents this otherness that not only exists
in us, and, from which we can not escape, but is also that
which constitutes our identity in such a way that we can not
say “I” without acknowledging an opaque side which resists
control of the announced that intends to apprehend it
completely and exhaust it. When Freud, contrary to his own
medical education, really began to listen to the hysteria and
proposed “free association”, beginning a form of thinking
and a communicational act which went beyond the limits of
the conscious intention of the I, it was as though he opened
a silence, allowing an “other”, like a whisper, to blow in our
own ear, that of the analyst and of the patient, the words that
should be freely said. Thus, to listen to the other that lives
within us, we must quiet the “I” that wants to imposes itself
as controller of the consciousness, which is assumed in the
belief of an “I” equal to “myself,” refusing to be open to the
challenge of the difference. However, refusal of this
acknowledgement is destined for failure, with the certainty
of this inevitable presence of otherness that runs us over in
our daily life, that steals a memory and imposes an unexpected
one, that hides from us the meaning of our own actions and
tosses us into foolishness, into incongruence and astonishment
with our own words and actions.
We can, thus, conclude that the “problem of otherness”
covers the entire development of psychoanalytic theory, or,
more specifically, all of the development of Freudian thought.
However, if Freud doesn’t use the term, and doesn’t elevate
it to the statute of a concept, if he doesn’t articulate it
theoretically in his metapsychology, it is because he calls
it in many other ways, many different ways. Thus, to use
an expression of Lacan’s, one of his surprising neologisms,
we can say that the “otherness” is an “extimity” in the
Freudian discourse, it is the most exterior and intimate,
intimate exteriority. What shouldn’t surprise us, since we
know that the unconscious is exactly this “familiar stranger”
(Das Unheimliche [German: the Uncanny or Bizarre]), “this”
from which comes the “I”, the most exterior and the most
intimate, foreign land to which we are viscerally connected
as to a “Fatherland”. Therefore, Milner (1996) is able to
state that the theme of the other is “so intimate, that even
Freud, himself, doesn’t perceive it; so intimate, that this
intimacy is extimity. It is beyond internal.”5
However, our effort, what we would like to do in this
work, would be to define, in the other forms of the Freudian
designation - the Unconscious, Id and Superego - the
presence and the relevance of the problem of otherness as
constituent of the subject. But, primarily, we thought of
taking the field of the conscious I, sustenance of the modern
dream of autonomy, as a reference around which we can
circumscribe a discussion about the otherly dimension of
the unconscious, the superego and the Id. For sovereign I,
the unconscious system, the psychic instances of superego
and the Id are presented as true aberrations, as strange
foreigners. Freud (1917) revealed that the modern individual,
or the sovereign I, considers the mental as identical to the
conscient (Freud, 1917, p. 177). Thus, the radicality of the
Freudian proposal will be in unveiling a reality behind the
announced I, thus, a rupture in the identity, a strange
principle that is not necessarily opposed to the I, but that
may have a disconnected aspect in relation to the images
of the sovereignty of the I. If, on one side, the unconscious
system, the superego or the Id are perceived by the I as
foreigners, on the other hand, the Freudian theory, through
these concepts, confirms the dimension of otherness as
constitutive of the individual. In this context, we indent to
specify the point in which the I may base itself to defend
this thesis of foreignness of the unconscious system, the
superego, and the Id, in relation to the ideal of the
sovereignty of identity. Thus, the modern dream presents
an I as pure identity, an individual thought of as sovereign,
and Freudian theory puts forth a new concept of the
individual, which included the I and the identity, but adding
the otherness. We would like to explain the possible
argument for this “I” which sustains the thesis of strangeness
of the unconscious system, of the superego and the Id.
The Unconscious as Other
The article “The Unconscious” (Freud, 1915c), which is
the third metapsychological text, defines and announces the
essential characteristics of the purpose of psychoanalysis.
The first attempt at theoretical formulation of the concept of
the unconscious appears in chapter VII of the Interpretation
of Dreams. Fifteen years prior, Freud, who had become a
worldwide celebrity and had already begun the international
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5 Cited by, Fernandes, L. R. (2000). O olhar do engano – autismo e outro primordial (The look of deception - autism and the primordial
other). São Paulo, Escuta.
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psychoanalytical movement, already had vast clinical
experience and a respectable theoretical drive, and was, thus,
perfectly prepared to take up the construction of his
metapsychological synthesis as a type of ultimate foundation
of his theory. However, an attempt should be made to deepen
and clarify the central concept of psychoanalysis: the
unconscious. 
In this article, the concept of the unconscious is
approached from three dimensions which constitute a
metapsychology, being specifically, the topical, dynamic
and economical aspects. Discussion about the topographical
record revolve around the distinction between the descriptive
unconscious or preconscious, and the unconscious system
which refers to repressed content, and which has its own
characteristics. Attempts to elucidate the interaction and
communication between the systems is a central theme in
the approach to the psychic process in its dynamic aspect.
The economical perspective is treated, overall, when Freud
dedicates himself to the task of comprehension of the process
of repression and from the vicissitudes of free energy that
circulates in the representational chain.
Freud begins the discussion defending the necessity and
legitimacy of introducing the idea of a unconscious system
as a means to consistently apprehend psychic processes that
are clinically manifested. The thesis is based on the criticism
of conscientialism and points to the limit of the intentional
conscience. Parapraxes (“Freudian slips”), phallic acts, reveal
a dimension which goes beyond the powers of intentional
consciousness, thus, they are apparently a psychic product
expressed in language and actions lacking conscious intention
and will, and that, thus, escape, as in a brief flash, the effort
of the I to maintain its behavior under its own control. In
this way, dreams, phallic acts and neurotic symptoms, all a
group of phenomena that would come later to be called
“formations of the unconscious”, would remain unintelligible
if we insisted in equating them and reducing the totality of
the psychism of the conscience, since we would not be able,
without contradiction, to infer something like a conscious
intention subjacent to these phenomena and that would
remain, nonetheless, imperceptible to the conscious mind.
Consequently, Freud can assert that the equivalence between
conscious and psychism would result in a vicious circle
typical of petitio principii. 
This, Freud’s statement, constitutes the principal banner
of psychoanalysis in the critique against conscientialism of
psychology and philosophy which would supposedly be
dominant in the 19th Century. In this struggle, Freudism
has the romantic movement as an ally in its critique of the
illustrated primacy of reason. Thus, the romantic philosophy
of Schelling and Schopenhauer, as much as the romantic
literature of Goethe and Tieck, worked with the idea of a
blind force that would antecede and prevail over the
presumption of intentional consciousness and its presence
of autonomy. In Schopenhauer6, for example, we don’t find
direct mention of the term “unconscious”, but the philosophy
thereof conferred a positive status to the non-cognizant, and,
in this manner, created the conditions that made the study
of the elements that went beyond the limits of reason
possible.
Freud, ever being considered an “Aufklärer (scout)”, and
“Illustrated”, was, in a certain way, plunged deeply in the
mysterious waters of the Romantic tradition7 and also ended
up converting to a critic of reason and the powers of the
conscious mind. Freudism points out and dedicates itself to
explaining gaps in the consciousness. The phenomena to
which psychoanalysis glances are fundamentally distinct
from conscious phenomena. Of course, we still can’t neglect
to mention that Freud intended to produce a science of the
unconscious, which, hence, implies the existence of belief
in reason, which has never been repudiated. One could say
that the over-determination Freud suffered in the creation
of psychoanalysis produced in the author a kind of “skeptical
belief” in reason. But our goal is not to reflect here on
Freudian thinking’s epistemological ambiguities, but only
to emphasize that psychoanalysis constructed its object in
polemic juxtaposition to the conscientialist project. It is in
the depths of the philosophy of conscious, and exactly in
opposition to this paradigm that Freud would delineate his
research objective. 
Perhaps this rigid opposition between the unconscious
and the idea of intentionality should be refined. Since, in
Chapter VII of The Interpretation of Dreams, we find
indications of the idea of a unconscious intentionality, an
idea that would be present in the notion of meta-
representation. Affirmation of an unconscious determinism,
of a psychic causality, would betoken this idea of a kind of
6 Regarding Schopenhauer’s contributions to Freud see: Assoun, P.L., (1978). Freud, filosofia e filósofos (Freud, Philosophy and
Philosophers). Rio de Janeiro: Francisco Alves; Moreira de Oliveira, J. (1998). Freud e a filosofia: a herança schopenhaueriana (Freud
and philosophy: the Schopenhauerian heresy) Psicanálise e Universidade (Psychoanalysis and Universality) (Revista da Pós-Graduação
em Psicologia Clínica / Post-graduate Clinical Psychology Journal - PUC / SP), São Paulo, number 8, 1998.
7 See Andrade, Ricardo S., (2001) regarding the relationship between Freud and romanticism. A face noturna do pensamento freudiano
– Freud e o Romantismo alemão (The nocturnal face of Freudian thought - Freud and German romanticism). Niterói: Eduff. The author
presents ample discussion on the Freud’s relationship with romanticism, considering aesthetics, medicine and romantic philosophy. Also
see Loureiro, I. R. B. (2000). O carvalho e o pinheiro – Freud e o estilo romântico (The oak and the pine - Freud and romantic style).
Doctorate Thesis (PUC/S.P.). São Paulo.
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unconscious intentionality. We can say that there is a
subversion in the notion of intentionality, because
unconscious intention can only be known a posteriori
Nonetheless, the concept of the unconscious appears to be
contrary to the identity of the consciousness. Would the principle
of otherness, then, be unconscious? In the search for the answer
to this question, we intend to reflect on the dimensions of
otherness present in the metapsychological article “The
Unconscious” (Freud, 1915c) from two approaches: first, the
other becomes present in the Freudian text as a rhetorical
resource for argumentation, through the principle of the analogy;
then, we will explain the enigmas of otherness within the
process of production of the contents of the unconscious. 
Freud, upon defending the proposal of the existence of
the unconscious as legitimate, revealed that the postulation
of this idea is not removed in the usual way of thinking or
producing concepts. That which makes one aware is,
evidently, the conscious/pre-conscious system, since it is in
this system that we find the faculties of perception,
judgement, reflection and rationality, which compose the
process of awareness/knowledge. The unconscious, itself,
can only be conceived and accessed in the light of conscious
processes. One little exception: this statement does no negate
the thesis that the unconscious system possess another
operational logic distinct from the logic of the conscious/pre-
conscious system. Freud intends to demonstrate that this
thesis that proposes the universality of consciousness, a
presupposition of any theoretical production, can also be
valid for the establishment of the unconscious through the
principle of analogy. Thus, if the unconscious is not
immediately accessible, it is also not the consciousness of
the other, which is only accessible to use through inference.
That is, if we must infer the consciousness of the other
person, interpreting the signals of their presence from
immediate experience in our own consciousness, in the same
manner, we can infer the unconscious, via the various
indications of its presence, the formations of the unconscious
mind, as if it were a type of “other” within us. Thus, the
unconscious can be called the “otherly-other”.
Freud uses the argument of analogy to refute a possible
criticism of the ingenious empiricism over the concept of
the unconscious. Thus, the unconscious, itself, as far as a
universal principle and presupposition of any empiricism,
can not be empirically conceptualized. But the fact that the
consciousness of the other is an inference from the
indications that allow the presence of “something” similar
to my own consciousness, and that I attribute to my own I,
to be discerned is not an object of direct observations, never
shook the universal affirmation of the existence of the
conscience as psychic reality par excellence. Therefore, if
the conscientialist thesis is an inference, which is the
foundation and the conditions of possibility of all of scientific
production, above all, of the science that is caught up in an
empiricist epistemology, then it the empiricist critique of
the concept of the unconscious is also neutralized.
We can explain yet another use of the principle of
analogy as rhetorical argument. Freud invites the reader to
apply the process of inference to him/herself. All of the acts
and phenomena that are do not perfectly fit within the flow
of consciousness can be considered as belonging to another.
According to Freud:
...all acts and manifestations that I observe in myself, and
that I do not know how to connect to the rest of my mental
life, must be considered as being foreign, belonging to an
“other,” must be explained by a mental life attributed to this
other person (Freud, 1915c, p. 195).
Thus, since I don’t have access to the consciousness of the
other, and can only infer its existence through indications, I
do not have immediate access to the phenomena and acts that
are born in my psyche. I can infer, through the indications of
the existence of a second consciousness within me, that which
appears to indicate the present of an “otherness” within my
identity. In this case, Freud would be using an analogy of the
second order, an analogy of an analogy. The consciousness of
the other is reached by analogy’; creating an analogy with this
inference, we can say that the unconscious does not simulate
another, only as an exception that this other inhabits my own
being. If I apply the principle of the analogy to my own psyche,
I can find indications that I do not immediately recognize as
my own, which reveals, therefore, another in me, “something”
like a “second consciousness.”
In Freud’s words:
This process of inference, when applied to the individual,
despite internal opposition, does not, however, indicate the
present of an unconscious; it does indicate, logically, the idea
of another, second consciousness that, within the very I of the
individual, is united with the consciousness that is known/is
self-aware. (Freud, 1915c, p.195)
We perceive yet another function for the principle of
analogy: the thesis of universality of the unconscious can
be defended through the principle of analogy; the
unconscious can also be inferred. If Freud interprets the
gaps that occur in his flow of consciousness, and phenomena
such as dreams, parapraxis and neurotic symptoms, as
indications that attest to the present of an unconscious system
within his psyche, through inference, the author can also
consider as legitimate the supposition of an unconscious
system in other persons that are similar to him. We can
consider such phenomena in the other in the same manner
that we consider these same phenomena within ourselves,
as indications that permit inference of the presence of the
unconscious. The statement, “other people possess a
consciousness”, is a deduction that we infer by analogy. The
same rationale can be applied to the unconscious. I can infer,
by analogy with my phallic acts, dreams, and symptoms,
the existence of the unconscious in other persons. Thus, the
principle of analogy enables the universal postulation of an
unconscious system.
To apprehend the consciousness of the other by analogy
possesses, consequently, the difficulty that accessing my
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consciousness may be apprehended immediately; I can be
conscious of my own mental states, but in relation to mental
states outside of my own, there is an impassable, empirical
barrier. As regard the unconscious, an exception is made
necessary: since the unconscious is the principle of otherness
within us, it appears that the other has the greater facility
in interpreting the indications of the unconscious that blooms
within me. The I is directly affected by the content of the
unconscious, suffers the consequences of repression, but the
other possess an agent with privileged access to scout the
phenomena of the unconscious. In this sense, the dimensions
of otherness are fundamental in the dynamic of unconscious
communication: the analyst has a special place in the process
of plumbing the depths of the unconscious, enabling the
appearance of an other-transferencial of the subject. The
subject projects in the analyst fantasies and desires of their
unconscious, thus, despite the analyst being another person,
the subject sees the analysis from their own projections.
We observe that the use of the principle of analogy in
the metapsychological text, The Unconscious (Freud, 1915c),
reveals the presence of the other as a dimension that inhabits
the well of the I, and, also, reveals the possibility of
apprehending the other by inference. But it would be
interesting to apprehend the process of creation of this
principle of otherness in me. We would like to reflect on
the process of the production of the contents of the
unconscious, which inhabits our psyche, but enjoys an
ambiguous status, being simultaneously pertinent and foreign
to ourselves.
In the text History of the Psychoanalytical Movement
(Freud, 1914a), Freud states that the theory of repression is
the cornerstone on which the structure of psychoanalysis
rests. A fundamental statement of metapsychology, thus, the
unconscious, object of psychoanalysis, is the result of the
process of repression which brings about the cleavage of
the psychic apparatus into two grand systems. 
In 1915, Freud reveals that repression, one of the
vicissitudes of compulsion, occurs when displeasure invades
the psychic apparatus at a time when it should be only that
of compulsive satisfaction, transforming the pleasure of
satisfaction into displeasure. Displeasure becomes the
necessary condition, the motivational force that elicits the
process of repression.
Thus, the “movement of removal of the determined item
from the consciousness, holding it at a distance”(Freud,
1915b, p.170) is described as being the essence of repression.
In the first matter, the content of repression refers to the
ideative representatives of conflicting sexual desires. In the
process of repression, a separation occurs between the idea
and the affect, or rather, between the representative-
representation and the quanto of affection. The ideative
representative will be repressed, expelled from the conscious
mind, causing, thus, the cleavage of the psychic apparatus.
The affective representative may suffer three different ends:
(a) to be repressed or suppressed, meaning, hindered from
development; (b) suffer a qualitative transformation,
becoming anxiety; or, (c) finally, remain, in whole or in
part, just as it is. The affect can not be repressed; the ideal
horizon of the process of repression is constituted in the
suppression or repression of development of the affect. We
can consider quite successful that repression in which the
idea is repressed and the affect restrained (suppressed). The
result of the affect is fundamental for the success of the
repression; since it would be from the free affect that we
have the return of the repressed in the form of a symptom.
The quantum affect that still spins about the psychic
apparatus causes a psychological imbalance. This circulation
of the affect requires a formative operation, or rather, the
constitution of a form of creative expression that
encompasses the interests of the I, as much as the
unconscious desires. The symptom, the dream, and the
phallic act, are manifestations that make formation of the
free energetic quantum possible. The phenomena of the
unconscious are fruits of the solution of compromise between
the interests of the conscious mind and the anxieties of the
unconscious, but the element that demands this creative and
strange production (Unheimliche) is the free affect. Phallic
acts and their symptoms produce in the I a sensation of
“foreignness.” It appears that there exists an other within
the I, and that it would be responsible for these
uncontrollable phenomena. The appearance of uncontrolled
demoniac action expresses the strangeness of the I faced
with inconsistent phenomena. The unconscious appears to
the I as an other within its very being, but it seems important
to us to recall that the unconscious is an otherness in its
self, but the unconscious symptoms are, as symptoms, phallic
acts and creams which make it an otherness for us. The
phenomena of the unconscious represent, in a dislocated
and condensed manner, the repressed contents, or, that is,
are symbolic forms, distorted by censorship, of the ideative,
compulsive representatives that are repressed. But we insist
in the fact that the free affect is what would be the efficient
cause, the energetic cause, for production of the symptoms
and other phenomena that we attribute to the unconscious.
In this sense, we wish to defend the thesis that it is the
existence of the free affect, disconnected from the
representations, that brings about the experience of otherness
which lives deep within the hidden recesses of the I. 
The theory of representation has an extended tradition
in modern thought. Thus, the conceptual or ideative
representation would constitute the starting point for all
philosophical or scientific theorization on knowledge. The
representation makes possible theoretic production,
mediation, and contact with reality, itself. All experience
and all contact with reality is translated into concepts, or
rather, is represented abstractly. And, if knowledge aims at
the identity between being and reason, then to know would
signify, in a way, the reduction of the other to the same.
The philosophical project initiated by Plato sought to
construct a science of the truth, of the stable, however, from
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the perspective of platonic philosophy, being is the same as
reason. It is this equivalent that is questioned by Levinas
when the author proposes the primacy of ethics over
ontology. The other possesses an irreducible dimension that
survives even when rationality tends to reduce the other to
the same. And we can not forget that modern analysis of
the platonic ideal, which is found, for example, in Husserl,
requires an intentional I to control and contain the excess
of immediate experience through representations.
Nevertheless, the representation only retains coagulated
and superficial elements of the experience in itself.
Something always escapes language; reason does not succeed
in encapsulating the fullness of reality. Abstract or rational
knowledge makes possible symbolization, fixation and
universalization of experience, and, no less important, it
allows communication, the symbolic exchange of experience.
Thus, without the world of representations, men would be
condemned to isolation, since it is the power of representing
things that is the condition that enables opening of the man
to the world. But the price of this possibility of symbolic
exchange is the fixation of the establishment of experience.
The world as representation, as product of intelligible and
intentional knowledge, reduces the entirety of the otherness
of experience to the same as that of language. Emotion does
not follow the representation of the object, it precedes it.
Man is affected by the world, the whole hodgepodge of
sensations is translated and organized in words. The
representational organization of experience provides man a
certain control over his experiences. The human subject is
exposed without defense to all kinds of experience.
Intelligible knowledge affords a kind of defense against this
exposure in all its force and nakedness. Nonetheless, that
which first was a defense ends up becoming a symptom:
Man hides himself from reality behind the representation,
and the distance between experience and concepts appears
to grow ever larger, bringing man to fail to acknowledge
his own experiences in all of their density and richness, and
acknowledge only those mediated, selected and controlled
by the concept. In this sense, it is that which justifies the
feeling of foreignness that is experienced before affection,
like a free “real” of the ideative representation. In the process
of repression, the separation between affect and idea brings
about a world where conceptual mediation is barely
elaborated. Free affection, without the mediation of the
conceptual representation, produces in man the sensation of
something sinister. Emotion precedes the intelligible
representation of the conscious mind, which reduces the
other to the same, the free affection is pure otherness. It is
not perfectly adapted to the typical logic of conscious
production of intelligible and controlled concepts. Thus, it
appears to us that the sensation of foreignness produced by
the symptom is a product of the separation between affection
and idea, since this sensation can be reinforced when the
affect is tied to another idea that maintains a distant relation
to the original idea. The logic that dominates the principle
of the link between free affection and a new idea, unlike
the principle of identity, follows metonomical and
metaphorical logic. There is not, however, within the
unconscious principle of identity, in it, being is not equal
to reason. Thus, for the conscious I, faithful to the logic
proposed by modern rationality, psychological symptoms
appear as strange monsters, figures beyond the field of
control, literally a “non-I”.
The Superego as Other and the I as Object
Freud begins his Conference XXXI, “The Dissection of
Psychological Personality,” departing from ruminations on
ego and indicating that his exposition on the psychology of
the ego should introduce a new understanding of the
psychological underworld (Freud, 1933/1932, p. 64). In the
study on ego, an epistemological impasse is re-instated: how
to place our own I as the object of research? In Freud’s
words: “The ego is, in it’s very essence, subject; how can
it be made an object?” This is a classical objection broadly
consecrated in treatment of the history of psychology. Comte,
for example, criticized the constitution of a new science,
objecting that: “The mind can observe all phenomena, except
its own. The observer and the observed are identical”8. Freud
would neutralize this objection, and, thus, refute the scientific
confidence in conscientialism and in the unit of the mind.
Ego can be divided, and, thus, be taken to itself as object,
can observe and criticize itself (Freud, 1933/1932, p. 64).
In the pathological process of insanity, the egoist division
is sufficiently evident. However, the division of the ego is
not exclusive to psychosis, since clinical evidence provide
Freud with the perception of the existence of an observing
instance that keeps the ego under surveillance and exercises
its activity of judging and castigating the ego itself. This
instance was significantly called “the superego”. The
superego incarnates and expresses the presence of a moral
“otherly-other” within the I. The superego appears to be the
moral duplicate of the I, the other of the same I, that vigil
that observes and morally regulates. The concept of the
superego as an otherness would find explanation in the
Freudian statement that the superego assumes the roll
performed, in the beginning, by an external power, by the
parents’ authority (Freud, 1933/1932, p. 67). In this sense,
the superego would necessarily be an otherly instance, since
8 Cited by Schultz, D.P., & Schultz, S.E. (1992). História da psicologia moderna (History of Modern Psychology) São Paulo: Cultrix.
it is representative, not only of the “paternal other”, but of
the parents’ superego, or, rather, the “Other”, of culture itself.
As the Superego is the representative of the moral, it is
fitting that we reflect on its historical determinations, since
the superego of the child is constructed according to the
model of the child’s parent, and these, in turn, are inspired
in their parents, and so forth, “retroprogressively”. The
superego, according to Freud, becomes “the vehicle of
tradition and of all the long-lived value judgements that in
this way are transmitted from generation to generation. [...]
The past, tradition of race and of the people, live in the
ideologies of the superego...” (Freud, 1933/1932,  p. 72).
The principle of otherness, which thrives in the core of
the superego, is placed, therefore, as a result of the process
of formation of this instance, and, thus, the form as the
superego acting in the psychological make-up will reproduce
the otherly perspective. Actions originating in the super-
egoist force produce in the I a sensation of strangeness,
something that the I does not recognize as its own. Thinking,
primarily, in the formation of the superego, we can state
that it is not a coincidence that in the first page of the chapter
dedicated to presenting the superego, Freud (1923) begins
with a reflection on melancholy and identification, or, more
precisely, melancholic identification. The process of
identification and melancholy operate by the principle of
otherness.
Identification is defined by Freud as, “the action of
making one ego similar to another ego, in consequence of
which, the first ego behaves like the second in determined
aspects, imitates it, and, in a certain sense, assimilates it
within itself” (Freud, 1933/1932, p. 68).
In this way, a change occurs in the ego in the process of
identification, resulting from its approximation to another.
However, Freud describes, at the very least, three types of
identification: the first would be the result of a primitive
process, incorporation; the second arises from regression of
an objectal choice; the third would not be the consequence
of an explicit objectal cathexis. All three of these types of
identification may be implicated in the process of the
formation of the superego. Regardless of the method of
identification, the common thread of the various types of the
relation to the dimension of otherness. The process of
identification requires the presence of an other and the
assimilation on the part of the I of the elements of this other.
This, the meeting of the familiar other (parents) is primordial
under the conditions of the possibility of the constitution of
the superego. According to Freud, the superego is the result
of the formation of a precipitate in the ego, consisting of these
two (maternal and paternal) identifications united with each
other in some manner (Freud, 1923, p. 49). The superego is
formed from the remains of the Oedipal love, the love of the
I attempts to negate as itself, refute the legitimacy of this
love, which, in truth, has its origin in the Id.
The moral instance is the final product of a process that
involves cathexis and identifications within the Oedipal
experience. The others-objects of the libidinal investment
in the Oedipal complex are the parents, or rather, those
which exercise the function of mother and father. This first
object of love must be abandoned, allowing opening of the
subject to other objects. The abandonment of this object is
followed by the alteration of the ego, which, using the model
of melancholy, refers to the installation of the object within
the ego. According to Freud, “it may be that this
identification is the only condition in which the id may
abandon its objects” (Freud, 1923, p. 43). On the other hand,
identification assimilated as a thread of the ego, which
reproduces a characteristic of the abandoned object, functions
as a possibility of control of the ego over the id. The
superego would be, thus, the most important identification
of this type. The objectal libido, abandoned in the Oedipal
scene, must be transformed to a narcissistic libido, or, rather,
the impediment of the free drainage of the cathexis toward
the object makes the libido turn inward. This process, which
we summarily describe, implies a renunciation of sexual
objectives, which could be interpreted as a conceptualization,
and this would be the foundation of the very process of
sublimation. In a certain manner, the superego is a form of
sublimation and a type of melancholic introjection. 
In the melancholic vision, the I is lost, does not recognize
itself, feels like a stranger to itself. The idea of a narcissistic
identification in melancholy is perfect, since it propels us
towards the myth of Narcissus who was already dead within
himself before plunging into the water. Narcissus did not
live the experience of otherness, except in the experience
of being a pair within himself, or an other that had as object
his very self. Narcissus is the prisoner of the alienating
sameness of his own image, but the captivity in sameness
does not even point to a comprehension of himself, nor is
it a strong experience of identity. Narcissus lives the fractured
existence of being other, a reflective other that is the omen
of death, since in him there is no separation of the “same”.
In melancholy, the subject is invalidated by the other, crossed
by pain, and is lost, without the possibility of transforming
this pain into a true experience of meeting with the
Otherness, internal and external. The other exists in
melancholy, however, this other is reflective, or rather, is
situated in the dimension of sameness. According to Vasse: 
The secret of man is the desire of the Other. But, if to
remain imprisoned in the web of a structure that can,
imaginarily, reduce it to the Same, man loses his secret, and,
in an ever more mortifying conformity, his images, his own
name and, even his identity passes to be strange to him, since
the suffering means nothing beyond his alteration (Vasse,
1983, p. 33).
Thus, by principle, the process of melancholy is based
on a meeting with the other. However, this meeting possesses
low density otherness; since it is an other, but the
melancholic assimilation disavows the other in its difference.
In the process of melancholic introjection, the other is
assimilated as a “same”.
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In this manner, the superego is constructed from a
meeting with otherness, since, at the base of its process of
formation we have the identification and melancholy. But,
we must emphasize that, melancholy being the paradigmatic
model of the formation of the superego, it may present
pathological content and action which escapes the
comprehension of the I. Thus, if, on one hand the superego
is internal representative of the moral, the other, this agent
may express its moral perspective in the same pathological
manner. Regardless of its position, the action of the superego
is perceived by the conscious I as a foreign invasion. In
truth, the I representative of the modern dream of autonomy
more easily perceives the pathological actions of the
superego as foreign invasion, as is the case in moral
masochism. Because, the psychopathological masochist
requires the presence of the other as sadistic agent, but, in
the case of moral masochism, which is characterized by
Obsessive Neurosis, this agent is found within the I. The
otherly-other in the image of the superego prevails over the
I, being able to exercise its sadistic dominion on the I.
We know that masochism appears as one of the self-
destructive forms of relation between the I and the other.
There is no negation or neutralization of the otherness in
the economy of masochism. The other is untouchable, since
it is through its presence that meeting with suffering is
accomplished. We find in Freud’s work various references
to the problem of masochism, references which run through
the development of his work and the construction of his
metapsychology. Since the first allusions [the first refers to
masochism, a fiancée arranged flowers in the center of a
table through the idea of a feminine masochistic character
of deflowering] until its link with sadism and its integration,
through the Three Essays (Freud, 1905), in a general theory
of sexuality from 1914 to 1923, Freud maintains the idea
of an original sadism, but developed, in relation to
masochism, the fundamental ideas of feelings of guilt and
fear of castration, as well as the idea of the phantasm as
support of desire. After 1920, the concept of the compulsion
of death brought him to rethink his position on masochism,
which came to be conceived as original, which shed new
light on the clinical approach to Melancholy and Obsessive
Neurosis, through the link between masochism and feelings
of unconscious guilt. In 1924, Freud wrote the text The
Economic Problem of Masochism, which established,
definitively, the result of his reflections. 
Freud presents three types of masochism, differentiated
in a phenomenological sense. Feminine masochism, which
is based entirely on erogenous masochism, reveals fantasies,
frequently present in men, such as to be spanked, to be
copulated, to be castrated or blinded. Such fantasies appear
to be linked to the search for discipline intended for the
incestuous Oedipal desires, such as the fantasy of being
blinded, which is associated, since Sophocles tragedy, with
Oedipus’ destiny. In moral masochism, which refers to the
assumption of Oedipal guilt, the sadistic agent that attacks
the ego is internal; It is the super-ego. In the case of
production of the superego, we know that a diffusion occurs,
resulting from sublimation. The libidinal energy invested in
the Oedipal relation returns so that the I suffers
desexualization, thus causing the final sublimation of the
superego, the otherly-other that assumes the role of censor
to the ego. Thus, moral masochism is presented as a
psychopathological exit, where the otherly-other is the
sadistic agent. Freud reveals:
The conscience is the morality that arrises via superation,
the complete desexualization of the Oedpius; through moral
masochism, however, morality once again becomes sexualized,
the Oedipal complex is relived and a way is opened for the return
of morality for the Oedipal complex. (Freud, 1924, p. 211).
Thus, moral masochism represents a form of self-
punishment for the Oedipal desire. An excerpt from of a
case in my own practice can, perhaps, illustrate how this
process of super-egoist self-punishment relates to Oedipal
desires. Francisco is 25 years old, and is the youngest child
of a family that has 4 sons. His father is 88 and his mother
is 55 years old. The father is authoritarian and beat his sons
until they reached the age of 18 years, and managed all of
the family’s money, himself. The mother’s inheritance is
under the father’s control, and, hence, the lands, also in his
power, are abandoned. Francisco completed studies in
Agronomy, returned to the birth city of his mother, married,
and resolved to invest in his parent’s farm. The father
charged rent for the use of the lands. Francisco has advanced
technical knowledge in the area of swine production. He
did significant internships, received various invitations to
work for large businesses, but left everything behind to
return to his mother’s soil. He took several loans at a bank,
using the family name of his maternal grandfather. All of
the money was invested in the farm, he sought to produce
more than had ever been produced on his maternal
grandfather’s lands, because, for this grandfather, work on
the land has no value, one must only accumulate estates,
and the lands, even if unproductive, are a sign of wealth
and power. Francisco worked hard, from sunrise to sunset,
but when harvest time arrived, he was not able to harvest;
he became possessed by a debilitating guilt, but did not
know why. All his product was lost, and Francisco was
unable to pay his loans. From there, this unconsciously
sought weakness produced an unpayable debt with the bank,
concretizing, in the materiality of money, his symbolic debt.
The omnipotent desire to execute a task prohibited by family
history, an impossible task, arising from incestuous desire
to fertilize his mother’s lands, drove him to impotence and
to an existential impasse. The super-egoist guilt produced
the weakness and paralysis.
In the field of superegoist pathology, it is easy to
visualize the intervention of an other foreign to the I, but,
how does one support the foreignness of a superego that
slide towards pathology? The argument that supports the
foreignness for the I of a superego representative of morality
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must be sought within Freudian theory. The anthropological
concept commensurate to Freudian theory describes man as
an aggressive being. We can cite the famous passage of the
text Malaise in Civilization:
Men are not gentle creatures that want to be loved and
that, at best, can defend themselves when attacked; on the
contrary, they are creatures among whose instinctive
inheritances must taken into account a powerful capacity for
aggression (Freud, 1930/1929, p. 133)
In this way, an instance constitutive of the subject that
aims to contain this structural aggression may appear a force
imposed by an other. In Reflections in Times of War and
Death (Freud, 1915d), Freud made it clear that moral
behavior is an external imposition for the I through
susceptibility to culture (p. 319). Pressure from the immediate
cultural environment, and also historical cultural influence
from ancestors, transforms egoism and cruelty, under the
influence of eroticism, the necessity for love, in moral
conduct. Thus, this susceptibility may be temporarily
reversed by the situation of war (p. 323). 
When the community doesn’t raise further objections, an
end to suppression of passions is also verified, and men
perpetrate cruel and barbarous acts, fraud, and treason so
incompatible with their level of civilization, that anyone would
judge them impossible. (Freud, 1915d, p. 324 )
Thus, for the conscious I, sovereign and autonomous, the
superego is produced from foreign dimensions, and, in turn,
the actions of this instance are not recognized as belonging
to the identity of the I. To analyze the superego from it’s
constitution allows us to confirm its conditions of foreign in
the topic, since the superego permis control of the Id by the
ego, but, paradoxically, is not allied with the ego, but is
sometimes a foreign torturer of the I. On the other hand, the
super ego may be described as unconscious, without
belonging to the unconscious system, therefore, a true “alien”.
The Id as Other: Radical Foreignness
As the second topic and introduction of the concept of
the Id, we may consider that there arises in the Freudian
work an even more radical image of the otherly-other. The
introduction of this new psychic instance does not imply
abandon of the idea of the unconscious system, but also,
it is not only a new name for the same. The Id, similar to
the Unconscious system, does not obey the laws of logic,
since the absence of the principle of contradiction and of
the principle of negation would be clinically confirmed
through observation of the formations of the unconscious.
In the same way, also for the Id, the forms of space and
time are not a possible condition for their psychic
processes. Being situated outside of time and the laws of
logic, the Id also disavows value judgements, and,
consequently, fails to recognize the difference between
good and evil.
The clinic of psychosis interrogates the first Freudian
topic and reveals its limits. Discussion of the libido of the
I or narcissus is a paradigmatic example of this questioning.
We know that there is no repression in psychosis and that
no delirium suddenly return to something in the order of
compulsion and the unconscious. The unconscious content
of delirium is not reduced, evidently, to the concept of the
descriptive unconscious, since in delirium we are not dealing
with the contents of easy conscious access. The fragile
structure of the psychotic is divided, fragmented between
different Is. But also, because there is no repression, we
cannot confirm that it is simply a phenomenon of the
unconscious, in the sense of the first topic, because, there
is no repression. It is necessary, then, to elaborate a third
sense for the word “unconscious”, in order to enable a better
comprehension of psychosis. In psychosis, compulsion
appears to juxtapose the symbolic, which intends to insert
the subject in the record of representations. What is in list,
in this point, is the criticism and limits of representation.
The unconscious system, as conceived in the first topic, is
the result of repression of the ideative representations, thus
the affect is separated from the idea and possesses a different
purposes from it. Thus, repression refers to the contents that
are written in the field of representation, psychosis appears
to announce another type of unconscious material. 
Freud is seen, thus, compelled to seek a new purposes
for the term “unconscious”. By suggestion from Groddeck,
he adopts a term originally from the Nietzchean “Das Es”,
translated in its Latin form as “Id.” This Latin word
represents a demonstrative pronoun; It doesn’t present a
content or form. It is only “this.” It is precisely for this
“foreignness” that it was not possible to define the Id,
attributing to it a clear conceptual determination, since the
Id is that which resists any determination and can only be
understood negatively, by contrast with the Ego, or through
analogy. In the words of the master:
We approach the id with analogies; We call it ‘chaos’, a
cauldron boiling over with agitation. We describe it as being
open, in its extreme, to somatic influences and as containing
within itself compulsive needs that find within it psychic
expression... (Freud, 1933/1932, p. 78).
The Id is an anarchic field replete with energy that,
lacking intentionality, can not consider the outer world; It
is closed within itself; It is full of virtually immoral desires.
According to Freud, “it does not express collective will, but
only a struggle for the attainment of satisfaction of
compulsive needs, subject to observance of the pleasure
principle”(Freud, 1933/1932, p. 78). 
Thus, it incarnates the very principle of otherness, being
always foreign and not allowing itself be captured, casts its
sinister shadow over the I in the form of a dominating other.
In LaPlanche’s interpretation, the Id became unconscious
but foreign and closer to the vital forces. (Laplanche, 1978,
p. 157). The foreignness of the Id is guaranteed by the
introduction of three incomplete dimensions in the definition
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of the unconscious in the first topic. In the first place,
through the idea of the Id, psychoanalysis may consider the
compulsive perspective more appropriately, over all the
dimension of compulsion that escapes representation. In
second place, the Id opens a reflective space for discussion
of phylogenetic inheritance, over that which, in the
individual, radically goes beyond it. And, finally, the neutral
pronoun “Es” enables acknowledgement of the impersonal
nature as structuring agent of the subject, a concept that
brings us back to the tradition of romanticism and indicates
a certain juxtaposition in relation to philosophy of light and
the subject (Laplanche, 1978, p. 156).
Therefore, the introduction of the idea of the Id would
express a movement toward the interior of the
psychoanalytical theory, a new direction in relation to the
problem of anxiety, considered as a primordial affect.
Anxiety would not be only the remains of repression, but
would be, overall, the zero degree of the process of
subjectification. We cannot doubt that Freud has been doing
a reformulation in his theory of anxiety, since he, himself,
says explicitly: “The conception of anxiety, I was defending
in this essay, has moved a bit from that which seemed
justified until then” (Freud, 1926, p. 185). And, continues
confirming that this reformulation must be considered as a
consequence of the new division of the psychic apparatus
(Id, ego, and superego; Freud, 1926, p. 185). In the first
topic, anxiety appears as the result of repression; In the
second topic, Freud favors the anxiety of castration that
represents the original anxiety (Urangst) or the real-anxiety
(Realangst). This new theory of anxiety opens the discussion
for the limits of representation, since original anxiety can
not be completely captured by the world of representation.
This field of non-representable anxiety is connected to the
concept of moral compulsion. As Rocha reveals, the
compulsion of death obligated Freud to also review his
conception of the Unconscious, which, until then, was
primarily constituted by representations or contents
representative of repression (Rocha, 2000, p. 100). Thus,
the topical-dynamic vision in the first topic was giving
preference to an economical approach , in which the Id came
to be considered an original source of the libido (Rocha,
2000, p. 100). Thus, the Id comes to be the seat of
unnameable affects that evade representation. According to
LaPlanche: 
...of affects that appear to arise from the depths of the Id,
a simple and banal observation imposes itself: such an affect,
in the very measure in which it is independent from its
representative cortex, independent of a fantasy, is directly
marked by anxiety (Laplanche, 1978, p. 161).
For Andre Green, the primordial difference between the
unconscious system of the first topic and the Id is not the
fact that, in the last, there is room for the compulsion of
death (Green, 1973, p. 215), or rather, through it, that which
is imposed is the acknowledgement that in the foundation
of the subject there lives something beyond representation,
a “something” like a hole, a nothing, which is, however,
effective when it is manifest as anxiety. Thus, the Id is the
stage for affects that escape representation, for unthinkable
anxieties that frustrate the Id and are perceived as a radical
otherness. The innovation of the concept of the compulsion
of death is that of offering a place in the psychoanalytical
scene for the affects that are not representable, but that
ravage the I, even though this does not succeed in decoding
them. The sovereign I, conscious and autonomous, perceives
as foreign that which does not conform to the field of
representation. We return to the image of abandon present
in the production of the symptoms, but now with more
radicality.
It seems that the Id is the most obscure form of the
image of the otherly-other, that which inhabits the
“foundation” of the subject and would be found “beyond”
or “beneath” the forms consecrated by the Modern Science
of representation. The Id presents a dimension of an original
otherness. That which is the most foreign, which escapes
the logic of representation and that reveals: “the I is, and
alway was, an other”.
Some Partial Conclusions
The first Freudian concept that makes this image of
otherness effective is the unconscious system. The dimension
of otherness of the unconscious is primarily perceived from
the analogical construction between the inference of the
conscious of the other and the inference of another
consciousness within the I. Through this analogy, Freud
defends the thesis of the existence of the unconscious and
its universality. The unconscious, according to this logic,
would be the other, and, thus, appears to us relevant to the
idea that in order to access the unconscious, the presence
of the other is important.
But the dimension of otherness of the unconscious goes
beyond the theoretical dominion of the analogy and is
translated in the tangibility of the psychic processes, or,
rather, the dynamic of the production of this system, visible
clinically, and which produces its condition of otherness.
The separation between the affective and ideative
representatives, condition for repression, produces a feeling
of foreignness before the free affect, dislocating ideative
representation.
On the other hand, the unconscious is the result of the
meeting between the various images of otherness. Repression
is produced from the prohibition of the Law (radical
otherness) over the little Oedipus, as far as its incestuous
other-object. The forbidden desire, prohibited, castrated, is
the condition of possibility of the repressed unconscious,
which we here refer to as the “otherly-other”. What is
interesting here is that this logic of the production of the
unconscious has another byproduct, which also represents
a figure of otherly-other, namely, the superego.
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Finally, we have the Id as an image of the otherly-other,
constructed in the field of pure otherness, escaping, thus,
greater theoretical determination. We believe that we can
conceive a gradation between these three figures of the
otherly-other, according to the logic of a greater reflective
density. The Id represents a more “abstract” image in the
field of otherly-other, and, in this sense, is the most difficult
concept to understand. Next, we have the superego, which,
despite being presented as a breakdown of the I, is connected
before the compulsive field, and, finally, we have the
systematic unconscious, which, constituted from the other,
is presented to the conscious in various clinical phenomena. 
Thus, the I perceives the unconscious system, the
superego, and the id as foreign strangers, not recognizing
these otherly figures as belonging to the subject. According
to Freud (1917), the discovery of the sexual compulsion and
of the unconscious are equivalent, however, to the statement
that “the ego is not the master of his own house.” Thus, it
is no wonder that “the ego does not look favorably on
psychoanalysis and obstinately refuses to believe in it”
(Freud, 1917, p. 178). In conclusion, we would like to
present a Freudian prescription:
You behave as an absolute dictator, that is content with
the information provided by its closest advisors, and never
mixes with the common people to here their voice. Turn your
eyes inward, contemplate your own depths, learn first to know
yourself! Then, you will understand why you become ill, and,
perhaps avoid illness in the future. It is thus that psychoanalysis
has sought to educate the ego (Freud, 1917, p.178 ).
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